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2007 I Estate Tax Valuation I 28 
18 In this regard, the Court deferred to state law in finding there was a 
binding contractual obligation to redeem the stock from Blount's estate, 
despite the fact that the buyout agreement was held invalid for purposes of 
valuing the corporation for estate tax purposes. 
19 In arriving at this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit cited as precedent an 
opinion of the Ninth Circuit and an earlier decision of the Tax Court: 
Cartwright v. Comm'r, 183 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1999) and Huntsman 
v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 861, 875 (1976). 
20 IRC § 2042. 
21 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (as amended in 1979). 
22 Treas. Reg.§ 20.2042-1(c)(6). 
23 Referring to Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(t). 
24 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6). 
25 See True v. Comm'r, 390 F.3d 1210, 1239-41 (lOth Cir. 2004) (collecting 
cases that both support and disregard provisions in buyout agreement 
setting value). 
26 Under the "rule of the circuit," the Tax Court is required to follow the 
rule of the circuit court in which the litigation arose (i .e. , where the taxpayer 
resides). See Golsen v. Comm' r, 54 T.C. 742 (1970). Consequently, the 
circuit courts could split with respect to a particular issue. In such event, 
the United States Supreme Court might hear the case in order to resolve the 
issue. 
29 I Vol. 17 I North East Journal of Legal Studies 
REGULATING CONSENSUAL RELATIONSHIPS IN 





With the entrance of woman into the workplace and the 
current American trend to spend more time at work, office 
dating is on the rise. Vault's 2005 Office Romance Survey 
revealed that fifty-eight percent of employees have been 
involved in an office romance, up from forty-six percent in 
2003.1 Another survey found that ninety-two percent of over 
31 ,000 men and women questioned admitted to finding a 
coworker attractive and flirting with him or her? 
While the office may be evolving into the hottest 
singles scene, these statistics give employers plenty of reasons 
to fear potential lawsuits. Completely prohibiting dating 
among co-workers has proven impractical and difficult to 
enforce. One major concern is a sexual harassment claim 
following a bad breakup between two employees. Legal 
Assistant, Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP, NYC 
In light of the inevitability of romance in the workplace, many 
employers are experimenting with "love contracts" to protect 
themselves from potential sexual harassment claims. 
*Associate Professor of Legal Studies 
Ithaca College School of Business 
*B.S. Cornell University, 2005 
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Employees wishing to date one another must first sign a written 
contract that the relationship is in fact consensual, and that they 
are willing to therefore waive their right to bring a sexual 
harassment claim in court. This appears to be a safe 
compromise for employers, offering their workers the freedom 
to date but preventing possible liability. To date, such 
contracts have not been tested in court, but they are likely to 
raise a variety of problems. Invasion of privacy, actual validity 
as a contract, and exposure to other forms of liability are only a 
few of the reasons that love contracts are not the best way to 
handle the rise in office dating. 
This paper will first review the background case law on 
sexual harassment that formed the basis for the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) guidelines 
regarding sexual favoritism and consensual relationships in the 
workplace. Secondly, the authors will discuss recent state and 
federal cases involving paramours and failed consensual 
relationships between co-workers. The authors then will 
explain why love contracts may not be the most effective 
method by which to address the changing norms of 
fraternization on the job and will offer management 
suggestions for a more practical and lawful way to avoid the 
negative fall-out of consensual relationships in the workplace. 
TITLE VII AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 
A. Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Claims 
In the 1986 decision, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the 
Supreme Court provided distinct definitions of the two existing 
forms of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile work 
environment.3 Quid pro quo is the clear situation where 
plaintiff's submission to or rejection of unwelcome sexual 
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conduct is the basis for employment decisions affecting the 
plaintiff. Secondly, the Court held that "a plaintiff may 
establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination 
based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work 
environment... [and that in order for] sexual harassment to be 
actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter 
the conditions of (the victim's] employment and create an 
abusive working environment.4" Meritor held that 
discrimination under Title VII is not limited to a tangible loss. 
"The phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' 
evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum 
of disparate treatment of men and women in employment.5" 
Though the Court did not determine the standard for liability, it 
agreed with the EEOC that courts should look to agency 
principles for guidance. The Court explained that while 
employer liability is not strict, employers are not immune 
simply because they have policies prohibiting sexual 
harassment. Rather, liability will depend on the adequacy, 
timing, and effectiveness of their remedial action.6 
More recent Supreme Court decisions have increased the 
need for employers to be proactive in avoiding sexual 
harassment claims. Both Faragher v. City of Boca Raton7 and 
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth8 helped to clarify the extent of 
the employer's liability, which the Court had failed to fully 
address in Meritor. Prior to the holdings in these two later 
cases, Title VII plaintiffs were encouraged to "state their 
claims in quid pro quo terms, which in tum put expansive 
pressure on the definition.9" 
In Burlington Industries the plaintiff, Ellerth, was forced 
to endure remarks and gestures of a sexual nature, as well as 
threats to deny her tangible job benefits from an employee in a 
supervisory position. Although those threats were not carried 
out, and in fact Ellerth was promoted once, she chose to leave 
2007 I Regulating Consensual Relationships I 32 
her job, but did not report the abuse until after she had quit. 10 
Similarly, Faragher was subjected to physical and verbal 
harassment by her supervisors. She also chose not to voice her 
1 . II comp amts to management. 
The Supreme Court sought to impose agency principles 
of vicarious liability for damages caused by the exploitation of 
supervisory authority and to encourage employers to prevent 
instances of sexual harassment. In both cases, the Court found 
that 
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to 
a victimized employee for an actionable hostile 
environment created by a supervisor with 
immediate (or successively higher) authority 
over the employee. When no tangible 
employment action is taken, a defending 
employer may raise an affirmative defense to 
liability or damages, subject to proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence.. . No 
affirmative defense is available, however, when 
the supervisor's harassment culminates in a 
.bl 1 . 12 tangt e emp oyment actiOn. 
Furthermore, the Court noted that the employer's 
vicarious liability can be limited if the employer is able to 
prove that "it acted reasonably in preventing or correcting 
sexual harassment, or that the employee acted unreasonably in 
failing to utilize the employer's preventive or corrective 
. . 13, opportumtles. 
B. Sexual Favoritism 
The EEOC has also provided guidance for employers on 
what claims are cognizable under Title VII, and the 
Commission's guidelines are accorded deference in sexual 
33 I Vol. 17 I North East Journal of Legal Studies 
harassment cases.14 In a 1990 policy document, the EEOC 
addressed the extent to which employers can be held liable for 
unlawful sex discrimination by persons who were qualified for 
but were denied an employment opportunity or benefit because 
they did not submit to sexual advances or requests.15 Here the 
EEOC explored how three different manifestations of "sexual 
favoritism" in the workplace might adversely affect the 
employment opportunities of third parties in such a way as to 
create an actionable charge of either "implicit" quid pro quo 
harassment and/or hostile work environment harassment. 16 
First, the Commission looked at isolated instances of 
preferential treatment based on consensual romantic 
relationships. Though perhaps unfair and offensive, such 
favoritism does not discriminate against men or women in 
violation of Title VII because both are equally disadvantaged 
for reasons other than their genders 17• This principle has come 
to be known as the "paramour rule" because the non-paramour 
is disadvantaged simply because of the supervisor's romantic 
preferences, not because of any illegal discriminatory activity. 
Second, the Commission dealt with favoritism based on 
coerced sexual conduct. If the relationship at issue was not 
consensual, then other qualified men and women may be able 
to establish a Title VII violation by showing that in order to 
obtain a promotion, it would have been necessary to grant 
sexual favors. In addition, they would have standing to 
challenge the favoritism on the basis that they were injured as a 
result of the discrimination suffered by their co-worker. 18 The 
third category is widespread favoritism of consensual sexual 
partners. The EEOC's position is that when such behavior 
permeates the workplace, those who do not welcome such 
conduct may have a cause of action based on the creation of a 
h .1 . 19 ostl e environment. 
The memorandum heavily relied on the 1988 case of 
Broderick v. Ruder20 to further explain how widespread sexual 
favoritism can violate Title VII. The case involved allegations 
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by Catherine Broderick, a staff attorney at the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), that two male supervisors had 
engaged in sexual relationships with secretaries who later 
received promotions, cash awards and other job benefits, and 
that the plaintiff herself had been subjected to isolated 
instances of unwanted sexual advances by her supervisor. One 
supervisor repeatedly pressured her to let him give her a ride 
home, and when she finally accepted, he barged into her 
apartment and toured the premises, including her bedroom. 
Though intrusive, there was no physical contact. The same 
supervisor regularly made crude jokes in the office and 
maintained a known and visible liaison with one of the 
secretaries. A different supervisor, the Regional Administrator, 
became drunk at an office party and untied the plaintiffs 
sweater and kissed her and another female employee. 
Throughout her eight year tenure at the SEC, the plaintiff had 
demonstrated her capabilities as an attorney, but the friction 
with her supervisors escalated over the excessive socializing in 
the office and Broderick's unwillingness to be a "team player." 
Over time, the plaintiffs performance ratings deteriorated as a 
result of upper management's growing resentment of her 
refusal to 'go along, in order to get along'.21 
The District Court had little trouble finding that the 
conduct of Broderick's supervisors created a hostile work 
environment, undermined the plaintiffs motivation and work 
performance, and deprived her and other female employees of 
opportunities for job advancement22. Any documented 
deficiencies in her work performance were directly attributable 
to the general atmosphere in which she worked.23 The 
defendant maintained that Broderick's claims were really for 
quid pro quo harassment and that other than the two isolated 
situations described above, she was not sexually harassed. Any 
sexual misconduct by supervisory personnel was not directed at 
Broderick and was merely part of the "social/sexual interaction 
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between and among employees.24" The defendant argued that 
Title VII was not intended to regulate sexual morality in the 
workplace. The court readily dismissed these contentions. 
While consensual sexual relations in exchange for tangible 
employment benefits might not create a cause of action for the 
willing recipient, such advances, for those who do not find 
them welcome, do create and contribute to a sexually hostile 
working environment.25 
The EEOC endorsed the court's theory, but significantly, 
it noted that "these facts could also support an implicit ' quid 
pro quo' harassment claim (italics added) since the managers, 
by their conduct, communicated a message to all female 
employees in the office that job benefits would be awarded to 
those who participated in sexual conduct.26" The Commission 
went on to state that in a situation where management 
personnel regularly solicited sexual favors from subordinate 
employees in return for job benefits, those who did not 
willingly consent or welcome this conduct might be able to 
establish that the conduct created a hostile environment, even if 
they were not directly solicited. Such conduct is actionable 
because it communicates a message to all employees that job 
benefits are conditioned on acquiescence to sexual relations.27 
Facts such as those that arose in Broderick require an analysis 
that partially blurs the distinction between quid pro quo and 
hostile environment sexual harassment. 
C. Consensual Relationships Gone Awry 
The EEOC's 1990 Policy Guidance has not been revised, 
and to date, no federal court of appeal has issued an opinion 
finding that the complained-of consensual favoritism was 
sufficiently widespread to create a hostile environment.28 Until 
this past year, no state supreme court had directly addressed the 
issue?9 Then in July of 2005, the California Supreme Court 
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ruled in Miller v. Department ofCorrections30 that non-favored 
employees could bring such a claim. The conduct revealed in 
this case goes well beyond the SEC's loose, fraternity party 
atmosphere under scrutiny in Broderick. 
The co-plaintiffs in Miller were two female corrections 
employees, Edna Miller and her assistant, Frances Mackey, 
who claimed sex discrimination, harassment and retaliation by 
their supervisor, Kuykendall, and his three paramours (Brown, 
Bibb, and Patrick) who were also employed by the Department 
of Corrections. In soap opera fashion, the saga went on from 
1991 until 1998 and was carried over to a second correctional 
facility as Kuykendall arranged transfers and promotions for 
his "women". The three frequently squabbled over him, 
sometimes in emotional scenes witnessed by other employees, 
and they openly boasted to the plaintiffs about their ability to 
influence Kuykendall. Brown, in particular, flaunted her affair, 
and when vying for a promotion for which Miller was more 
qualified, Brown announced to Miller that Kuykendall would 
have to give it to her, otherwise she would "take him down 
with her knowledge of every scar on his body" (internal quotes 
omitted).31 The situation worsened when another female 
warden, Yamamoto, became close with Brown. It is not clear 
whether they were engaged in a lesbian relationship, but they 
teamed up against Miller to make her life miserable. The 
plaintiffs suffered verbal abuse, demotions, reduced pay, 
threats, and in one instance Brown physically assaulted Miller 
and held her captive for two hours. When plaintiff Mackey 
sought help to release Miller, Yamamoto would not 
intervene. 32 Kuykendall refused to investigate Miller's 
complaints of harassment, citing his relationship with Brown, 
and her relationship with Yamamoto. He told Miller that he 
should have chosen her, which she took to mean that he should 
have had an affair with her instead of Brown. 33 
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Finally, in 1998, Miller and three other employees filed a 
confidential complaint with Kuykendall's supervisor, stating 
that the "institution was out of control.34" Brown soon learned 
of Miller's cooperation with the ensuing internal investigation, 
and Brown and Yamamoto began a campaign of ostracism 
against Miller and regularly interfered with her orders. 
Kuykendall withdrew accommodations that Miller received 
due to a physical disability. On one occasion, Brown had an 
angry confrontation with Miller and followed her home. Miller 
then obtained a restraining order against her,35 and the 
plaintiffs brought an action for sexual harassment pursuant to 
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. 
Despite the sexually charged atmosphere at the state 
prison and the events unleashed by Kuykendall's multiple 
affairs, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the California Department of Corrections. The trial court and 
the Court of Appeals reasoned that the supervisor's grant of 
favorable employment opportunities to the three women with 
whom he was having concurrent affairs did not constitute 
sexual harassment of non-favored employees because there had 
been no attempts to coerce sexual relations from them, and 
non-favored employees of both genders would be equally 
disadvantaged. Relying heavily on the EEOC memorandum, 
the California Supreme Court disagreed. It held instead that 
the facts of the case indicated that sexual favoritism in this 
workplace had indeed become so widespread that the message 
was that employees were sexual "playthings" for the boss. The 
situation could constitute an actionable hostile environment. 
The lower courts erred in refusing to let a jury consider the 
plain tiffs' claims. 36 
Certainly, the rather lurid facts in the Miller case are 
unusual. Nonetheless, it raises new concerns for management. 
Plaintiffs may now allege (and courts may allow juries to 
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decide) that consensual sexual behavior and fraternization 
among colleagues, particularly where there is a supervisor-
supervisee relationship, creates a workplace that is permeated 
with widespread sexual favoritism and hence establishes a 
h '1 . 37 ostl e environment. 
PARAMOURS AND PERSONAL ANIMOSITY 
A. The Paramour Rule 
In order to put Miller into perspective, it is worth 
returning to the case law that has developed under the well-
established paramour rule and a corresponding line of cases 
that focuses on employment actions that are based on 
underlying personal animosity resulting from a failed romantic 
involvement. These cases demonstrate that the employer is 
generally insulated from liability for sexual harassment, as long 
as the initial relationship was consensual. 
The chief case in point is Decintio v. Westchester County 
Medical Center, where seven male respiratory therapists 
claimed that they were denied a promotion that went to a 
woman with whom the Program Administrator was having an 
affair.38 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
clearly stated voluntary, romantic relationships cannot form the 
basis of a sex discrimination suit under either Title VII or the 
Equal Pay Act.39 "The proscribed differentiation under Title 
VII .. . must be a distinction based on a person's sex, not on his 
or her sexual affiliations," and there must be "a causal 
connection between the gender of the individual or class and 
the resultant preference or disparity.40" For Title VII purposes, 
the court found no justification for defining "sex" so broadly as 
to include an ongoing, consensual romantic association. Any 
other interpretation " . .. would involve the EEOC and federal 
courts in the policing of intimate relationships.41 " 
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State courts, in construing similar provisions against 
discrimination, have likewise held that as long as the favoritism 
is based on personal romantic preference, not coercion, there is 
no actionable discrimination on the basis of gender. For 
example, in Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., the plaintiff, 
an at-will employee, sought relief for reverse sex 
discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination, claiming that fabricated charges of sexual 
harassment were brought against him and that when he retained 
an attorney, he was dischar?ed so that his supervisor' s 
paramour could be promoted.4 The plaintiff was unable to 
produce any evidence that had he been a woman, he would not 
have been fired. Moreover, management had the right to fire 
an at-will employee for a false cause or for any cause, unless it 
violated public policy, and hiring an attorney is not a 
"protected activity." The firing may have been unfair, but the 
court concluded that it was not illegal.43 
Employers thus may find some comfort in Decintio and 
its progeny because employment decisions that are the result of 
isolated instances of favoritism will not give rise to successful 
discrimination charges. Employers should recognize, however, 
that even isolated acts of favoritism may nonetheless contribute 
to a general perception of unfairness and may lead to poor 
morale and distrust. Employers should also be concerned that 
such preferential treatment does not begin to permeate the 
workplace in a way that could later be deemed "widespread". 
Along this spectrum, employers also need to worry about the 
flip side of romantic relationships in the workplace--those that 
go sour. Numerous cases address the problems of personal 
animus dictating employment decisions and/or negatively 
affecting the work place following a failed relationship. While 
again, employers are protected from Title VII claims in these 
cases, the facts are often nasty and disruptive to the workplace. 
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B. Personal Animosity 
In Succar v. Dade County School Board, the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that any analysis under a hostile 
environment theory must focus on whether the complaining 
employee was targeted because of his or her gender, and that 
personal feuds cannot be turned into sex discrimination cases.44 
Plaintiff Succar, who was married, had carried on a year long 
affair with another teacher, Lorenz, when Lorenz began 
threatening Succar's wife and son. Succar's wife obtained a 
restraining order against Lorenz, and the extra-marital affair 
ended soon after. Lorenz was extremely bitter, and she began 
to verbally and physically harass Succar, publicly embarrassing 
him in front of colleagues and students. Succar claimed that 
the school principal took insufficient steps to remedy the 
situation, and he subsequently filed a complaint alleging hostile 
work environment sexual harassment. Agreeing with the 
district court, the Court of Appeals observed that "Title VII 
prohibits discrimination; it is not a shield against harsh 
treatment at the work place.45" Lorenz's harassment of the 
plaintiff was not due to his gender, but rather her anger and 
disappointment at having been jilted.46 
The following year, the same court applied the reasoning 
in Succar to a claim arising out of a consensual relationship in 
the quid pro quo context. In Pipkins v. City of Temple Terrace, 
Florida, plaintiff Houldsworth engaged in a consensual 
relationship with Klein for approximately one year.47 Klein 
continued to romantically pursue Houldsworth after she ended 
the affair. Although Klein had a supervisory position in 
Houldsworth ' s department, her immediate supervisor was 
Florence Lewis-Begin, a friend of Klein's wife. Houldsworth's 
job evaluations began to deteriorate once she terminated the 
relationship, and when the City Manager learned of the 
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problems he commenced an investigation and Klein was 
ordered to seek other employment. Nonetheless, Houldsworth 
continued to receive poor evaluations from Lewis-Begin, and 
Houldsworth ultimately resigned, claiming constructive 
discharge.48 Citing Succar, the Court ruled that any 
harassment Houldsworth suffered was attributable to her failed 
consensual relationship with Klein and the feeling of enmity it 
engendered in both Klein and Lewis-Begin. She did not meet 
the Title VII requirement of a showing that the altered terms 
and conditions of employment were "because of ... sex.49" 
New York's prohibition against discrimination on the 
basis of sex pursuant to Executive Law Sect. 296(1)(a) tracks 
the language of Title VII. The statutory term "sex" has 
likewise been interpreted to be synonymous with "gender," and 
does include variants of sexual activity, liaisons, or 
attractions.50 Thus, in Mauro v. Orville, a legal secretary who 
had an intimate relationship with her boss, an attorney, could 
not sustain a claim of discrimination due to her sex when he 
discharged her in order to reconcile with his wife. 51 A plaintiff 
would need to demonstrate that there were unwelcome sexual 
advances after termination of the consensual relationship in 
order to support a claim that the discharge was motivated by 
gender.52 
The foregoing cases establish that employees will not 
succeed in a Title VII suit when the complained of employment 
actions were taken to alleviate strained relations following the 
breakup of a consensual union. They also illustrate, however, 
how uncomfortable such situations may become, and how they 
may draw other members of the work force into the fray. 
Much like any acrimonious divorce, the resulting fall-out is 
divisive as co-workers take sides, and at a minimum, such 
intrigue is a distraction most employers would rather avoid. 
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EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH EEOC 
GUIDELINES 
While case law shows that sexual favoritism as a result of 
a consensual relationship and allegations of sexual harassment 
in the form of personal animosity are extremely difficult cases 
for a plaintiff to make out, sexual harassment suits are still 
something to be feared by employers. In 2005 the EEOC 
reported that 12,679 charge receipts were filed and resolved 
under Title VII claiming sexual harassment discrimination as 
an issue. Costs are high for businesses fighting these serious 
allegations, and companies paid a total of $4 7.9 million in 
monetary benefits. (This figure does not include damages 
awarded from litigation/3 
What can employers glean from these decisions? It is 
essential to develop and to uphold a strict sexual harassment 
policy in the workplace. Without one a company will be 
unable to defend itself against sexual harassment claims that 
may arise. Aside from potential financial losses, these 
statistics prove that sexual harassment continues to be a 
problem in the workforce, and employers must be proactive in 
protecting their employees. Furthermore, companies need to 
be aware of how the national rise in office dating may affect 
their operation, and they should familiarize themselves with the 
different options for handling consensual relationships so that 
they can become equipped to deal with the ramifications of a 
traumatic break-up in the workplace. 
Before employers look for ways to completely eliminate 
the possibility of a romance budding between two co-workers 
(instilling a simple non-fraternization policy), they should 
consider how the relationship will affect the business if it goes 
well. Depending on the size and nature of a company, office 
relationships can have a positive influence. 
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Having a love interest at the office can make employees 
overall more content in life. Being happy is proven to make 
people more motivated, productive, and physically healthier 
than those who are unhappy.54 Employees may be less likely 
to rush home at the end of the day if they know that staying late 
to finish their assignments means that they can take a dinner 
break in the cafeteria with their significant other. In addition, 
the couple will share a common interest: their line of work. 
This could lead to job related brainstorming outside of the 
office. Couples may also feel the desire to impress each other, 
and work to their highest ability in order to appear smart and 
competent in the eyes of their loved one. By allowing people 
to date each other at work, employers have the potential to gain 
more hours, enthusiasm, motivation, and productivity from 
their employees all while making their staff happier in life. 
Employers should weigh the costs and benefits of 
allowing consensual relationships to take place at work, but 
they cannot ignore the fact that in today's work environment 
officemates are probably already dating. A more recent 
approach to handling this challenging situation is the 
development of the love contract. 
REVEALING ALL-LOVE CONTRACTS AND 
PRIVACY 
A. Creation of the Love Contract 
Looking for an innovative approach to accommodate 
office romances and worried employers, the San Francisco firm 
of Littler Mendelson developed the first love contract in 2000. 
Since then the firm has completed hundreds of contracts for 
clients over the past few years.55 In a 2005 article published by 
Stephen Tedesco, a partner at Littler, he recommends love 
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contracts to employers as a means of protecting employers 
from both sexual harassment claims and sexual favoritism 
disputes.56 He states that a love contract "documents that the 
employee's relationship is consensual, they are aware 
company's sexual harassment policies and agree to mamtam 
proper, professional office behavior and, if the employees are 
in a supervisor-subordinate working relationship, both parties 
agree that one will transfer to another department or work 
group. 57" 
There are several apparent benefits to enforcing the use 
of these contracts. First, it confirms in writing that the 
relationship is in fact voluntary. Furthermore, it ensures that 
the involved parties are aware of the company's policies 
towards consensual relationships and sexual harassment. Some 
practitioners recommend holding a separate discussion with 
each employee to ensure that the relationship is truly 
consensual, and using this meeting as an opportunity to review 
the company's sexual harassment policy and complaint 
procedure. Employees should also be advised that signing the 
agreement is not a condition of employment and that they may 
want to consult with counsel before signing. A key component 
of the contract is that employees should be required to notify 
the employer if and when the relationship ends and the 
employer should closely monitor the post-dating situation for 
problems. 58 Finally, it guarantees that if the relationship falls 
through, any potential disputes will be handled through 
mediation or binding arbitration. Advocates of love contracts 
argue that these methods will be more time and cost effective 
for all of the involved parties, and will not tie up the court 
system. 59 
B. Off-hours Dating and Privacy 
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Perhaps the biggest concern with love contracts is that 
they have yet to be tested in the courts. Though they borrow 
concepts from contract and employment law, it is possible that 
they could lead to claims of invasion of personal privacy.60 
Employees asked to sign such an agreement might feel 
compelled to reveal an extramarital affair or a homosexual 
relationship. A few states, including New York, Colorado, 
North Dakota, and California have privacy protection statutes 
that afford employees some degree of protection for non-
employment related activities.61 
Though several cases have been filed in New York in 
both state and federal court questioning whether personal 
employee relationships are protected "recreational activities," 
no clear consensus has yet emerged, and love contracts were 
not at issue.62 The reasoning in these cases is nonetheless 
interesting and instructive for employers considering the 
introduction of the rather intrusive love contract. 
In pertinent part, New York Labor Law §201-d states that: 
2. Unless otherwise provided by law, it shall be 
unlawful for any employer or employment 
agency to refuse to hire, employ or license, 
or to discharge from employment or 
otherwise discriminate against an individual 
in compensation, promotion or terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment 
because of: 
c. an individual's legal recreational activities 
outside work hours, off of the employer's 
premises and without use of the employer's 
equipment or other property.63 
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The statute defines "recreational activities" as: 
any lawful, leisure-time activity, for which 
the employee receives no compensation and 
which is generally engaged in for recreational 
purposes, including but not limited to sports, 
games, hobbies, exercise, reading and the 
viewing of television, movies and similar 
. 1 64 matena. 
The key case that examined the language and purpose of 
the statute is New York v. Wal-Mart Stores, in which Wal-Mart 
had discharged two of its employees for violation of its 
"fraternization" policy that prohibited a "dating relationship" 
between a married employee and another employee other that 
65 1 d .. his or her own spouse. In a somewhat convo ute opm10n, 
the majority held that "dating" was distinct from a 
"recreational activity" because its key component was 
"amorous interest," and as such, it could not be included in the 
statute's clearly delineated categories of leisure-time 
activities.66 Since the indispensable element of dating, "in fact 
its raison d'etre, is romance, either pursued or realized," it 
could not be counted as an activity within the purview of the 
statute.67 Judge Yesawitch, in a strong dissent, argued that the 
statute encompasses all social activities, whether or not they 
have a romantic element, "for it includes any lawful activity 
pursued for recreational purposes and undertaken during 
leisure time.68" The majority's holding gave no protection to 
social relationships that might contain a romantic aspect, 
regardless of the participants marital status, or the impact of 
their relationship on their capacity to perform their jobs.69 
Judge Y esawitch urged instead that the statute be read broadly 
to effect its remedial purpose: 
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... given the fact that the Legislature's primary 
intent in enacting Labor Law Sec. 201-d was to 
curtail employers' ability to discriminate on the 
basis of activities that are pursued outside of 
work hours, and that have no bearing on one's 
ability to perform one's job, and concomitantly 
to guarantee employees a certain degree of 
freedom to conduct their lives as they please 
during non-working hours, the narrow 
interpretation adopted by the majority is 
indefensible. 70 
The New York Court of Appeals has never addressed the 
issue, and the Wal-Mart decision has been followed in 
numerous cases. For example, in Bilquin v. Roman Catholic 
Church, the plaintiff, a Pastoral Associate for Faith Formation, 
had no cause of action under Labor Law § 201-d(l)(b) for 
wrongful termination when she was not renewed for 
employment due to her cohabitation with the husband of a 
parishioner.71 Likewise, in Hudson v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 
plaintiff had no cause of action when he was dismissed for 
having an extramarital affair with a co-employee.72 Nor did he 
have a cause of action for any form of discrimination on the 
basis of sex or marital status, because his female paramour was 
single, and she was also terminated.73 
The only federal case to date, however, may be most 
predictive of the future of privacy claims that arise out of 
consensual office romances. In McCavitt v. Swiss Reinsurance 
America Corp., the plaintiff, an officer of the company, was 
romantically involved with another officer. Despite the fact 
that the company had no written anti-fraternization policy, the 
plaintiff was passed over for promotion and ultimately fired 
because of their dating. 74 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit reluctantly agreed with the district court that its 
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decision was governed by the Third Department's decision in 
Wal-Mart, and thus it dismissed McCavitt's complaint on the 
grounds that dating is not a protected recreational activity. 
Absent persuasive evidence that the New York Court of 
Appeals would reach a different conclusion regarding the scope 
of "recreational activity" under the statute, the Court felt bound 
to apply the interpretation of New York's intermediate 
appellate court?5 Circuit Judge McLaughlin, in his concurring 
opinion, urged that the New York Court of Appeals, if given 
the chance, should reach the opposite conclusion. Endorsing 
Judge Yesawich's reasoning quoted above, Judge McLaughlin 
added a common sense, reality check: "Romance has a 
distinctly distinguished history of originating in office contacts. 
It is one of the most cliched of movie plots ... (and quoting 
Justice Frankfurter), 'There comes a point where this Court 
should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men."' 76 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 
EMPLOYERS 
A. Avoid Using Love Contracts 
The rise in office dating is clearly a sticky situation for 
employers to handle. Trying to find a balance between turning 
a blind eye and ruling the office romance scene with an iron 
fist is more difficult than it sounds. It is not surprising that the 
safety net love contracts appear to cast for employers has 
become so popular. However, it is unlikely that these contracts 
will be of any real use to the employer, and they are not worth 
the attorney fees it would cost to have them drafted. 
Forcing employees to sign one of these so-called "love" 
contracts places them in a very awkward and unnatural 
position. It's doubtful that two people will decide to consult 
with the Human Resources department before they even go out 
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to dinner with one another. Signing an agreement turns the 
casual date into a big commitment, and couples are far more 
likely to simply hide their relationship.77 Furthermore, since 
these contracts have yet to be tested in court, their validity may 
not hold up. Employees who feel pressured to sign such 
agreements could later argue that the circumstances were 
coercive in that the employer gave the tacit message that 
signing (and waiving certain rights to sue) was an implied 
condition of continued employment. Thus love contracts may 
"poison the waters" and leave the employer wide open to other 
potential forms of liability. Once the employees have signed 
the agreement, there is a written record that the employer is 
aware of the relationship. It is likely that such admissions will 
reveal relations between employees that may be homosexual, 
inter-racial, mixed religions, extramarital, etc. If one or both 
members of the couple later suffer a tangible employment loss, 
they may be able to make out a discrimination case against the 
employer on the basis of grounds other than sex. Finally, love 
contracts send the negative message to the employees of the 
firm that their employer is limiting their rights to their own 
privacy, as well as limiting their protection from sexual 
harassment if that situation does arise. 
B. Protecting Employees While Protecting the Company 
To create the most productive work atmosphere, 
employers should be focusing on making their employees feel 
safe and content. Instead of limiting the rights of their 
workers, companies should focus their efforts and legal 
resources on drafting strong policies against sexual harassment, 
should educate their employees on how to follow them, and 
should regularly monitor and consistently enforce such 
policies. Statistically it is inevitable that consensual 
relationships will occur at most operations. Employers need to 
achieve a balance between decorum in the work place and the 
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extremely offensive behavior exhibited in Miller, and to a 
lesser extent, in Broderick. Employment law practitioners have 
offered the following advice to navigate this terrain: 
Employers should keep in mind the key factors 
behind the Miller court's decision (and the 
EEOC's policy) in order to evaluate the legal 
risk to the company including, (1) the number 
of employees with whom the supervisor had 
sexual relationships, (2) the number of 
supervisors engaged in sexual relationships 
with subordinates, (3) how public the 
relationships are in the office and the 
interaction between the employees who are the 
supervisor's paramours and the supervisor. (4) 
whether the employees having these 
relationships are receiving benefits that other 
employees are not receiving and which are not 
justified by performance or other merit-based 
reasons; (5) whether the employees that are 
having these relationships with supervisors 
wield power over the employees who are not in 
such relationships; and (6) whether the overall 
feeling in the workplace is that in order to be 
promoted or receive equal treatment, an 
employee must have sexual relations with the 
. 78 supervisor. 
To date, the case law indicates that it is extremely 
difficult for employees to successfully claim discrimination on 
the basis of sex if they are discharged because of either an 
ongoing consensual union or because of strained relations 
following a breakup. Nonetheless, employers who insert 
themselves in their workers' private lives by either imposing 
unrealistic non-fraternization policies or requiring workers to 
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voluntarily come forward and to sign love contracts, may 
ultimately find themselves sued in privacy actions. Given 
these multiple constraints, an employer's best option is to 
emphasize a strict sexual harassment policy and to require a 
professional atmosphere in the work place. This method will 
provide support for employers in court, but more importantly, 
it will send a positive message to employees that management 
wants to protect their rights, not to restrict them. 
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EMINENT DOMAIN AFTER KELO V. NEW LONDON: IS 
CHANGE IMMINENT? 
By 
Dennis D. DiMarzio*, Glenna Summer**, and Lonnie 
Jackson*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court has historically 
played the critical role of hearing and deciding cases that 
ultimately define our society as one oflaw. Many of the 
Court's decisions have been handed down with little fanfare, 
and any national publicity and debate faded soon thereafter. 
Sometimes, however, the Court renders a landmark decision 
which involves such a fundamental right and has such 
immediate and long term implications that a firestorm of 
national publicity and debate continue long after the decision 
date. One June 23, 2005, the Supreme Court decided such a 
case, Kelo v. New London, 1 an eminent domain decision, and 
the firestorm of publicity and debate continues. In Keto, 2 the 
Court dramatically expanded the eminent domain power of 
government to take private property for "public purposes" 
rather than "public use." The Court reasoned that a 
Connecticut city could constitutionally take private property in 
the name of economic development by a private developer. 
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